Whoever fired the first shot in Mukacheve, eastern Ukraine, last week’s confrontation between gunmen of the ultranationalist Right Sector movement and the police illustrated a number of worrying characteristics of today’s Ukraine. They also pose a challenge to Kiev’s western well-wishers: does a good friend overlook his mate’s failings, accepting that “he’s going through a rough patch” and hope he snaps out of it, or does he tell some tough truths?
“Master In Your Own Home”
One of the definitions characteristic of a working state is that it has a monopoly of legitimate force. Sure, it can subcontract that out to suitable providers, from mercenaries to privateers, security guards to proxy warlords. But the key point is that it gets to decide who can use force, what kind, and what are the rules under which they must operate.
In the immediate aftermath of the Maidan, when part of the state was virtually disintegrating, and when Yanukovych had been toppled by force of revolutionary muscle, it was perhaps inevitable that the militias would at first have a life of their own. In the early weeks and months of the Donbas war, when the regular military chain of command was mistrusted by its political masters and frankly in questionable shape, it was perhaps understandable that Kiev would gratefully turn to militias from nationalists to the private armies raised by oligarchs.
But that was then. In the interim, the military has been reformed to a degree at least. Even such units as the notorious Azov Battalion have come into the fold, finding a place within the formal military or Interior Ministry chain of command. However, Right Sector still operates virtually autonomously. Indeed, its response when some of its men tangled with the police was to back its own and challenge the authorities. The longer such a situation lasts, the harder it is to address and the more delegitimating it is. And that applies to the wider question of the private armies, as much as the specific Mukacheve fracas.
Kiev needs to prove that it is in charge – and if that means using force, so be it. Revolutions can be messy, and sometimes revolutions actually have to devour some of their children. Encouragingly, President Poroshenko has since said that “no faction will have armed units, not armed criminal formations… No one is allowed to give patriotic chevrons to bandits” and we will have to see if he follows through.
“Hands Out Of The Cookie Jar”
Ukraine has a plethora of problems. Many of them the result of economic, historic or geopolitical misfortune, but others definitely its own responsibility. One that Mukacheve appears to illustrate – Right Sector claims they were attacked by corrupt cops – and which to me is a particularly serious one is criminality and corruption.
The latest Transparency International Corruption Perception Index suggests – sadly, rightly – that Ukraine is even more corrupt that Russia, which is an accolade that Kiev can hardly enjoy. This is a particular problem within the law enforcement bodies (making the suggestion that Mukacheve was about a struggle between Right Sector and corrupt officials over local smuggling routes rather more credible). The trouble is that this is being addressed in showy and visible reforms at the bottom of the system rather than at the top. Much was made recently of the swearing in of a new crop of allegedly photogenic new police officers for Kiev in brand new uniforms. Well and good; bringing in a new generation is often a great way to begin changing the culture of an institution, especially if – as in this case – they have been through a new training curriculum emphasizing values and probity.
However, this may bring change in a generation. Meanwhile, too many of the old guard remain in key positions, and this is the kind of expensive, media-friendly exercise unlikely to be replicated across the country. Besides which, corruption is more about entrenched control of legal and illegal business ventures rather than the quaint, bespoke extortion of a fake speeding fine here, a payoff there.
Allegations that the Mukacheve firefight was actually over control of the illegal cigarette smuggling business in this border region are all too credible. While the flow of illegal cigarettes into Europe from Ukraine has actually fallen over the past year (probably because the factories producing them were in the Donbas), there is am embarrassment of other goods to make up any shortfall, from timber going west to stolen cars still coming east.
Meanwhile, the magnates – oligarch is such a benign term for virtual independent wielders of not just economic and political but often military and criminal might – remain untouchable by the law, and with them their clients, agents, allies and stooges. Even Ihor Kolomoysky, who sent armed men to seize Ukrnafta offices over a dispute with the government, was simply sacked from his position as governor of Dnepropetrovsk – and given the face-saving consolation of being able to say he had resigned.
How far does this matter? It matters. It matters in practice: according to the then-health minister last year, for example, 30-40% of the budget for medicines is stolen, while an estimated 44% of economic output is in the underground – and thus untaxed – sector. It also matters in terms of the morale and legitimacy of the nation. Transparency International estimate that up to 50% of all Ukrainians have had to pay a bribe.
A National Agency for the Prevention of Corruption is being formed, but even this is already mired in controversy, with a series of anti-corruption NGOs challenging the basis on which its members will be selected. While there is the potential for this agency, and other reforms which have been enacted, to begin to make a real difference, unless and until the law can be seen to be applicable even to the most powerful figures in the country, Ukrainians will be cynical. After all, they have good historical reasons to be.
“Take Responsibility”
Predictably, explanations for the explosion of violence in Mukacheve acted as a litmus test for deeply-held beliefs. To some, for example, any attempt to present Right Sector as an out-of-control militia also involved in criminal operations was a vile slur on upright and honorable patriots. But amidst the chaos, retrospective justifications and mutual recriminations, it was also striking how quickly a particular line emerged: the Russians done it. Somehow, when Ukrainian police and militia fight it out at pretty much the most western end of the country, one could put the blame on Moscow.
This piece from RFE/RL, for example, channels a pervasive theme in Ukrainian discussions about the incident. While doing a good job of outlining the rival explanations, it then cites a Ukrainian analyst that “The FSB has successfully picked up the [KGB’s] baton… For Russia, Transcarpathia and its surroundings remain an important region. Taking into account the blurred identity and ethnic diversity of the local population, the field of activities for these agents is quite fertile.”
I’m never a fan of the oblique implication; to be blunt, it’s a very Russian style, the whole “can it be a coincidence?” approach that Kiselev so favors. But the essence is clearly that this could not have happened without Russian machination.
Indeed President Poroshenko told an emergency meeting of the National Security Council that renewed tensions in Donbas “have been mysteriously synchronized with an attempt to destabilize the situation in the rear – and not just any rear, but in a place 1,000 kilometers away from the front line.” Again with the oblique implication.
Of course the Russians have been stirring the pot as assiduously as possible, including organizing a terrorist campaign inside Ukraine. And the Mukacheve mayhem is indeed a gift to Moscow’s propagandists, as a story that manages to combine right-wing violence with tales of corruption and incompetence within the Ukrainian administration.
But where is there any hint of evidence to back up the “Russian connection” story? If it has been an open secret for ages that Right Sector has been penetrated by Moscow’s agents, is it not a terrible indictment that the SBU security service has been so unable to catch a single one – and has not even said anything about these suspicions, even though it is usually pretty outspoken? And can one simply dismiss as “cover story” the way that Moscow has formally labeled Right Sector as a “terrorist organization” and reported arresting members planning attacks in Crimea?
My particular concern is that a very real enemy – Moscow – also becomes a convenient, catch-all excuse for both Ukraine and its friends abroad. No serious efforts to address corruption? Well, that’s impossible while fighting the Russians. Some terrible military decisions? Well, the chain of command is full of Russian agents. Economy in shambles? That’s Russian terrorism and energy politics. Armed clashes in the west of the country? Nothing to do with endemic local corruption and state weakness, just Russian plots.
Ultimately, Ukraine cannot and will not win this war on purely military terms. It is building up a significant (and expensive, but that’s another matter) armed force, and unless Moscow is willing to deploy extensive further forces, ripping away what tatters of deniability it maintains, Kiev should be able to block any major rebel offensives. But by the same token, a reconquest of the Donbas really depends on Russia being willing not to escalate.
As much as a military conflict, this is a war of governance: of will, legitimacy, political maturity, and economic endurance. Kiev will need to demonstrate that it can govern honestly, effectively and inclusively – especially if it is ever to reassimilate the citizens of the Donbas. And addressing the culture of corruption, embezzlement and oligopoly that has developed in the past twenty – or maybe two hundred – years will be crucial not just to get the crippled Ukrainian economy on track, but also to allow real and serious state building.
“We Need To Talk About Kiev”
Let’s be clear: the new government elected after the Maidan faced an epic series of challenges. Some things they did and have done well enough. There has been significant reform in the economic sector, for example, especially in trying to address the budget deficit, and clean up the banking and energy sectors.
Other things, not so much. It is an interesting, if ultimately arid exercise to speculate how different things might have been without the war to drain their coffers, distract their attention and militarize their policies.
And also, to be honest, make the West feel it has to be nice to them. Ukraine was hardly high on their list of priorities beforehand. One could question how far it really is now. But one of the pernicious outcomes of the Donbas war and Crimean land-grab has been that somehow to speak ill of Kiev is now all too often interpreted as provide aid and comfort to Moscow.
This is infantilizing the Ukrainians, who need to be encouraged to build their country afresh and not given excuses. It is noteworthy, for example, how many of the very real reforms being applied within the economy can, in part, at least, be ascribed to pressure from the IMF, never the most sentimental of institutions, which has been a notable exception in its preparedness to talk tough and set strict conditions for its assistance. When you have a $17.5 B stick to wave, people listen.
The more general resistance to pushing Kiev is also damaging efforts to help it, though, because Western allies and donors, not being imbeciles, know the problems at work. So, while mouthing warm words, they sometimes hang back from providing the kind of concrete assistance, from cash to shared intelligence, that Kiev needs. Unwilling to see their secrets leaked to the Russians (after all, real progress in reforming the SBU is questionable, despite former chief Nalyvaichenko’s optimistic claims of progress), or their aid wasted or spirited off to Swiss bank accounts, they quietly hold back. I’ve encountered many officials in both the USA and Europe, who freely admit that while they will continue to try to keep Kiev on life support as long as it is not too expensive so as to deny Moscow the satisfaction of outlasting it, they have all but written off any early hopes that Ukraine was finally going to break out of its cycle of partial-but-inadequate reform followed by a descent back into corruption and cronyism.
So Kiev needs to get its act together. And Kiev’s Western friends need to be the right kind of friends, the ones willing and able to call Kiev out when it screws up, but equally willing to hold out a hand to help it up when it does stumble.
